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Introduction 
Group Lending Experiences in 
Reaching Small Farmers 
B. M. Desai* 
The rural poor in many low income countries (LICs) have 
received very little formal credit. To improve their share 
these countries have introduced one or more of such reforms as 
supervised credit programs, concessionary interest rates, 
special credit institutions, group lending, loan insurance, 
and credit reservation. This paper deals with the experiences 
of one of these reforms, namely group lending in the Dominican 
Republic, Ghana, Malawi, Bolivia, Philippines, Thailand, India, 
~ Nepal, Sri Lanka and Bangladesh. Based on the analysis of 
these experiences we attempt to show that the potential inno-
vative1 nature of this reform is greatly constrained by the 
simultaneous pursuit of policies characterized by the conces-
sionary and inflexible interest rates, lack of balance in 
developing credit and other services, and the inadequacies in 
the performance evaluation norms for the bank staff. Before we 
present this analysis we briefly compare justification for and 
features of this reform with those of the cooperatives patterned 
after the Raiffeisen model. 
* Visiting Professor, Department of Agricultural Economics and 
Rural Sociology, Ohio State University, and Associate Professor 
on leave from Indian Institute of Management, Ahmedabad, India. 
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Rationale and Features of Group 
Lending and Cooperative Reforms 
Both these reforms have been introduced to improve the 
rural poor's share in the formal credit. They have been chosen 
for both economic and non-economic reasons. But there are 
some important differences in the emphasis attached to these 
factors. 
Cooperative reform, unlike the group lending, was prompted 
from a concern to organize a force to counter the usurious 
2 power of the village moneylenders. Private commercial banks 
were not preferred because they were also considered implicit 
and indirect partners of the usurious rural credit environment. 
Unless an organization based on the village community partici- ~ 
pation was developed, it was believed the virtues of self-help, 
thrift, and modernized attitudes 3 which are necessary to deal 
with the local moneylenders could not be promoted. This is 
not to suggest that the consideration of high costs and high 
risks of rural finance operations did not motivate the cooper-
ative movement. Indeed, the features of administration by 
honorary management and local participation, unlimited liability 
of the members, and small and simple operations were to help 
reduce these costs and risks. 4 · Another feature was that these 
cooperatives were to receive state partnership in both equity-
capi tal and administrative leadership. 5 
Group lending unlike the cooperatives had its immediate 
origin in the collateral related difficulties 6 experienced by 
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the existing formal agencies in the rural financial market (RFM). 
Neither the clear and heritable land title nor the guarantee · 
of the reputable third party nor the hypothecation of reason-
ably "assured" anticipated crops produced could be available 
from the rural poor. Under these conditions the rural poor's 
dependence on the informal nredit agencies continued to persist. 
Even when these conventional collaterals were available they 
could not be used to foreclose the loan wheri necessary because 
of legal, political and economic difficulties in enforcing the 
contract. The joint liability principle of group lending was 
considered to act as a substitute for the conventional collateral. 
In some countries like Ghana, tangible collateral in the form 
of land or some other property was taken from one of the 
members of the group. Other members were required to sign a 
promissory note only. Peer pressure and collective responsibility 
were combined to reduce the default risks. 
Because of such reliance on local participation and un-
limited liability, this reform is sometimes considered a pre-
cooperative concept. It must, however, be recalled that some 
of these features were more clearly applicable to the early 
cooperative movement. In the later period large sized societies 
with their limited liability were organized mainly to improve 
their financial viability by enlarging the scale of operations. 7 
But the concern to reduce costs of rural finance operations 
through group lending wa~ also strongly shared~ This was con-
sidered necessary to overcome perceived barriers to financial 
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intermediation between the rural poor and the formal lenders. 
This perception is based on three inherent features which 
characterize economic activities of the rural households. 
These are small size, riskier enterprises, and. the mismatch 
between cash inflows and outflows. Even rural households per-
ceived these as barriers to an entry in the formal market. 8 
Thus, what is not explicitly considered for this reform, unlike 
the cooperatives, is the motive to create a force to counter 
the village moneylenders. Similarly, state participation in 
equity capital was not considered, though this reform has also 
state assistance in the form of extension, input supplies, and 
more importantly concessionary refinance. 
Functions of Group Lending 
From the preceding it is clear that the immediate functions 
which group lending reform aims to accomplish are: 
1. Reduction in the lender transaction costs; 
2. Similar scale economies in the provision of 
related technical assistance and other services 
which promote productive use of additional 
liquidity resulting from a credit transaction; 
3. Reduction in loan default risks on account of 
peer pressure and joint responsibility; and 
4. Reduction in the borrower transaction costs. 
Have these functions been realized, and what may explain 
the results of this experiment may now be examined. Before we :) 
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attempt this we must clarify that these questions cannot be 
uniformly examined for different countries. This is because 
in some of the countries group loans have been provided to 
those who did not have any access to formal credit. Though 
most studies have relied on informed judgements about the 
changes in lender costs, some have quantified both borrower 
costs and loan delinquencies. Som~ studies did not select non-
group individual borrowers as a ''control" to compare with the 
group sample. Some others though, selecting such a sample, 
did not test the 'differences between the two samples to attri-
bute differences in their results to factors other than the 
borrowing status. 9 Despite these differences, the results of 
the group lending experiment are remarkably consistent across 
the countries. 
Results of Group Lending 
When the above mentioned functions are satisfied, con-
ceptually, there should result an expansion in this program. 
This expansion could be measured by the growth in the number 
of group accounts, and also in the average loan amount trans-
acted.10 It can also be evaluated by quantifying the changes 
in the flow of credit in favor of the rural poor. Measuring 
performance in this manner would require time-series data on 
the implementation of this reform. Most country studies have 
utilized cross-section data for a year or two. Consequently, 
these indicators cannot be used. Alternatively, the results 
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could be evaluated by directly studying what has happened to 
each of the four functions. To this we now turn. 
Lender Costs: All the country studies except the India 
study report that the financial institutions aimed at reducing 
their costs through this reform. The study on India reveals 
that the concerned bank did not pursue this aim, though it 
11 does report the bank's experience in this regard. All these 
studies except Ghana and the Philippines report inconclusive 
results about these costs. The Ghana study reveals lower costs 
for group loans, while the Philippines study reports higher 
costs. However, the lender costs could be higher for group 
loans in most countries if the costs of forming groups and 
providing other services are also added to the conventional 
transaction costs of lenders. These other costs are invariably 
borne by agencies other than the lenders. For example, in the 
Dominican Republic both these costs are borne by the refinanc-
ing agency: the Dominican Development Foundation. In other 
countries costs of providing technical services are borne by 
the government and the society at large. The only exception 
is India where these costs are shared by the lender and the 
government. But in most countries costs of forming groups are 
shared by the lenders, borrowers and the government. 
Lenders in the Dominican Republic, Bolivia, India and the 
Philippines have enjoyed Scale economies in making group loans, 
though a similar advantage is not experienced in the collection 
of these loans. But the Malawi lenders seem to have experienced 
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this advantage. It is, however, not known whether the same 
holds for costs in making group loans. Such partial gains may 
not be ehough to induce lenders to undertake other services. 
Ironically, however, the implied lender behavior of shifting 
costs to the government/society/borrowers does not prove 
beneficial to the lenders. This is because when these non-
conventional lending costs are borne by others they cannot 
possibly promote corresponding gains by way of better loan 
recoveries and larger turnover of loanable funds. Instead of 
relying on others to form groups which are homogenous and 
similar to non-group borrowers, lenders themselves could do 
this by using the existing village organizations or traditional 
informal groups to reduce the costs by forming groups. Such 
responses are not found in most countries except perhaps in 
Nepal and Turkey. The implied myopic view of the lenders 
might have originated from the inappropriate interest rate 
policies. The discouraging influence of su~h policies gets 
compounded in an environment of high inflation rate, stagnant 
rural productivity, and agricultural input/output price dis-
tortions. 
Scale Economies in Other Services: Most lenders have not 
seriously attempted to reap this particular benefit of group 
loans. Whatever such loans which have been administered by 
them have not resulted in "organizational good 1112 for non-
credit services including savings mobilization. Indeed, these 
loans have been provided to give an access to credit alone. 
• 
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The only exceptions being Nepal and Malawi where the lenders re-
quired in lieu of down payments, a deposit of 5 to 10 percent of 
the value of group loans as "security fund." These deposits 
carried interest earnings for the group. They were also used 
to cover shortfalls in the repayment of group loans. It is 
claimed that such additional "organizational good" derived by 
the group members in Malawi and Nepal have resulted in better 
loan repayments, besides the group solidarity and sustainance. 
However, these country studies do not provide any data to judge 
the costs of administering deposits in the manner just des-
cribed. Similarly, the country studies do not give any clue as 
to the costs advantages to other agencies which provide hon-
financial services. In the absence of experiences in providing 
these services by the lenders it is not possible to assess the 
need for compensatory gain, besides the individual pay-off, to 
develop an "organizational good." The multi-functional role 13 
implied in providing other services including savings deposit 
collection may not have developed ln most countries because of 
lack of appropriate incentives to the financial institutions. 14 
Default Risks: What is described so far about the two 
functions of group lending holds for this particular function 
also. The lower delinquency rate experienced in the initial 
years in the Dominican Republic did not sustain in the future. 
Even in Nepal and Malawi, if group loans were not tied with 
the deposit requirements, the delinquencies would be higher. 
Similarly, higher default rate of the group sample as compared 
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with the non-group sample in India was more because the former 
cultivated low productivity crops and had distant proximity to 
the bank. Repayment record of group loans in most countries 
was poor even though the reform required the non-delinquent 
members to repay the loan of the delinquent members. 15 In 
practice, most lenders found it difficult to enforce this re-
quirement. This may be because of lack of legal sanction to 
the joint liability principle. More importantly, it could be 
because of lack of other "organizational good" for the group 
members. In the absence of such good the lenders cannot exer-
cise any leverage to promote peer pressure as a substitute for 
the conventional collateral. Poor and delayed lender services 
have also lead to higher delinquencies in Bolivia, the Philip-
pines and the Dominican Republic. Without appropriate lender 
incent~ves, neither the multi-functional role nor the better 
quality and timely services can be achieved. 
Borrower Costs: Group borrowers enjoy cost advantages by 
saving fees for registering·a collateral, formal and informal 
expenses to obtain the certificates needed with the loan appli-
cation and by saving transportation and time costs of visiting 
the lenders. In the Dominican Republic and Bolivia, members 
of groups informally collected money to cover expenses for 
leaders who negotiated the loan. In some other cases these 
costs were shared by members by rotating the group leadership. 
Most cotintry studie~ except India and the Philippines 
report borrower costs to be lower for group loans. In the case 
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of India, the higher costs to group borrowers were, however, 
due to differences in the distance and technology factors rather 
than the diff°erences in the borrowing ·status of the two samples. 
When these differences were accounted for, the borrower costs 
were lower for group loans than for individual mortgage loans. 
This cost advantage would have been still larger had the bank 
not required separate loan application from each member of the 
16 group. Even the lender would benefit from such change in the 
loan execution process. 
In the Philippines the borrower costs were higher because 
of lengthy and complex loan procedures which necessitated the 
group borrowers to temporarily borrow from moneylenders at very 
high interest rates. While these borrowers in the Dominican 
Republic could benefit from the lower transaction costs, their 
gains would have been significantly larger had they received 
loans in time to avoid temporary borrowings from the money-
lenders. But the· complex and lengthy loan procedures would 
persist despite financial cost disadvantages to the lenders, 
again, because suitable incentives to the financial agencies 
are lacking. 
Such loan procedures partly explains group members disil-
lusion with this reform. This perception would also exist, 
despite lower borrower costs, when members are refused future 
loans because of delinquency by some other members or when 
members are forced to attend meetings without receiving compen-
satory gain besides the credit. Borrower gains from a group 
·. 
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loan reform can be perceived differently by different members. 
To a relatively well-off farmer, a group loan may be a reward 
for patronage, while to a· poor farmer it could represent an 
independence. When· groups consisting of ·such farmers are formed 
they may not succeed. Even a comparatively homogeneous group 
is unlikely to sustain if its maximum size is not controlled17 
as is the case in most LICs an4 if its members do not receive 
compensatory pay-offs, besides individual gains, from the col-
lective responsibility. Providing such pay-offs to the group 
members may not be possible without undertaking a multi-func-
tional role including savings deposit collection. And, to 
repeat, such roles cannot be performed when lender incentives 
are lacking. 
Concluding Remarks 
High transaction costs and high default risks are considered 
to be the twin problems of reaching small farmers in the RFMs. 
Both cooperatives and group lending reforms ha11e been experi-
mented with by many LICs to overcome these problems, though 
the former was also introduced to counter the force of the 
village money lenders. 
By examining the experiences of group lending in some 
LICs this paper has shown that the potentiality of this reform 
in reducing the delinquency rates, lender costs and borrower 
costs do not seem to have been consistently realized in these 
'. countries. ··Partial gains either to the borrowers or lenders 
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would not sustain this reform. Such results could be attri-
buted to policies which overemphasize concessionary and in-
flexible interest rates and underemphasize the provision of 
financial services other than credit. Like the cooperatives, 
again, group lending would not be able to improve the rural 
poor's access to the formal segment of the financial market, 
unless this policy imbalance is corrected. 
\ 
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NOTES 
Financial innovation is conceptually defined as that reform 
which facilitates providing and/or acquiring financial ser-
vices at lower transaction costs. In practice, as will be 
seen in this paper, such innovations for a product like 
"financial services" is difficult to achieve. This is be-
cause this product being fungible, divisible and homogenous 
in nature it can be used to shift the cost to any agent 
including government or society involved in the intermedia-
tion process. 
2. To quote from a study on cooperation in developing countries, 
"A primary motive for establishing cooperatives in develop-
ing countries is the desire to end the exploitation of 
large parts of both the rural and urban population by 
usurious moneylenders" (Engelmann, 1968, p. 86). Also, 
see Hough, 1966; Catanach, 1970; Carroll, 1969; Flores, 
1969; and RBI, 1954. 
3. To quote from a study on Asia, " •.. the farmer is backward 
and hostile to innovation and that therefore he should be 
stimulated to change, through various means like cooperatives, 
••. ," (Etienne, 1969). Also, see Engelmann, 1968 .and 
Catanach, 197 O. 
4. For example, see Schiller, 1967 and Belshaw, 1959. 
5. For example, see Hough, 1966; Engelmann, 1968; and Singh, 
1970. 
... 
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6. Such difficulties can be of two broad types. One is related 
7. 
8. 
to the very size of the collateral, and the other is related 
to the quality of the collateral. The former has typically 
prevented term loan transactions, since size of farm owned 
by a farmer makes him eligible to borrow amounts smaller 
than required to purchase the farm assets like a well, a 
diesel engine or an electric motor. In some countries, 
under these conditions, full term loans are provided by 
pooling collateral from more than one farmer. Such loans 
are, however, not treated as group loans for the purpose of 
this paper. 
See, for example, RBI, 1954. 
For an extensive treatment of how these barriers retard 
financial intermediation in both informal and formal RFMs, 
see Desai, 1980(a). 
9. These observations suggest a need for studies which are 
based on a firmer conceptual and methodological framework. 
For some illustrations on this for cross-sectional analysis, 
see Adams et al., 1979; Adams et al., 1980; Matienzo, 1978; 
and Desai, 1980(b). 
10. Such a measure would follow from cost advantages to both the 
lenders and borrowers, assuming other things remaining the 
same. It is also implied when financial innovation is 
treated in the sense of causing "net" shifts in both loan 
dSmand and supply sch~dules~ See Desai 1980(b) for this, 
and see Smith, 1971 for defining financial innovation in 
terms of shifters in the appropriate functions. 
• 
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11. This study being a pilot study was restricted to only one 
branch of one of the 14 nationalized commercial banks 
which have experimented with group lending. 
12. "Organizational good" is defined as that good which is 
not available unless the potential beneficiaries organize 
themselves to procure it. 
13 The need to provide services other than credit arises from 
the fact that delivering credit in isolation of such other 
requirements as extension, marketing, depositing excess 
liquidity, etc. is self-defeating to the objective of im-
proving incomes of the rural poor. It is also needed to 
effectively compete with the informal credit agencies which 
frequently embody these services in their credit contracts. 
This is not to suggest that formal agencies should undertake 
all kinds of other services. Basically, they should empha-
size provision of commercial services. Making available 
credit and savings deposit services is fairly straight-
forward. But providing marketing services would require 
some innovations like promoting supply of working capital 
credit to one of the group members or a local merchant(s) 
who may also form a part of the group. Such dealer credit 
could be given not only to stock and purchase commodities 
but also to promote sales. 
14. This could very well be the reason for the failure of credit 
cooperatives in becoming multi-purpose societies. 
I 
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15. The repayment record for the Ghana program is reported to 
have improved in the subsequent years~ This may_ partly be 
because of combining tangible collateral and peer pressure. 
16. Such procedure implied obtaining signatures of all 
members on every loan application since they were guarantors 
for each oth~r. It also additionally implied executing 
documents separately for all the members at the time of 
loan sanction. Even though the bank did not pursue the 
lower lender cost advantage through group lending, such 
a procedure is not justifiable since it increases borrower 
costs too. 
17. This is necessary to accomplish better distribution of 
compensatory gains for a successful group action. See 
Olson, 1973. 
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